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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite much effort put toward Canadian social policy renewal in the past decade, innovations in programming 
have been stifled due in large part to a lack of funding and accountability issues. This is clearly evident in the 
disability policy field related to labour market programming for persons with disabilities where the packaging of 
programs has continually changed; however, the actual contents have largely remained the same. The focus on 
federal-provincial dimensions has come to marginalize the role of disability organizations in the process, yet it is 
these organizations that governments may enter into partnership with in new governance arrangements to foster 
new programming. This article reviews data from charitable tax returns for the time period 2005–2010 to assess 
the human, financial, and technological capacity of Canadian disability organizations in five Canadian provinces, 
in order to implement innovative programming.  
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Malgré beaucoup d'efforts au renouvellement de la politique sociale canadienne dans la dernière décennie, les 
innovations dans la programmation ont été étouffées en grande partie à l'absence de questions de financement 
et de responsabilité. Cela est très évidente dans le domaine de la politique handicap lié à la programmation du 
marché du travail pour les personnes handicapées où l'emballage des programmes a constamment changé 
mais le contenu réel est restés largement pareilles. L'accent sur les dimensions provinciales fédérales est venu 
à marginaliser le rôle des organisations de personnes handicapées dans le processus, mais ce sont ces 
organismes que les gouvernements peuvent entrer en partenariat avec de nouveaux modes de gouvernance 
pour favoriser la nouvelle programmation. Cet article examine les données de bienfaisance des déclarations de 
revenus pour la période 2005–2010 pour évaluer les capacités humaines, financières et technologiques des 
organisations de personnes handicapées canadiennes dans cinq provinces canadiennes à mettre en œuvre des 
programmes novateurs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The lack of innovation in labour market programming for persons with disabilities in Canada has been well 
documented (HRSDC, 2008; Graefe & Levesque, 2010). Efforts to move from the delivery of broad vocational 
programming to innovative and targeted measures that prepare persons with disabilities for entry into the labour 
market have been met with limited success in that there have been few new programs introduced. Rather, the 
past ten years have mainly seen the repackaging or continuation of programs long established under the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Development Program (HRSDC, 2010). Exactly how such repackaging or continuation 
of old programs can meet current needs of persons with disabilities is unclear; a point stressed by many front 
line service workers and disability organizations (Graefe & Levesque, 2006, 2010). These results are surprising 
given the significant efforts the federal and provincial governments have expended at renewing the Canadian 
social union since 1995, including negotiation of the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA) and various 
social policy agreements (e.g., Labour Market Programming for Persons with Disabilities) (Telford, Graefe, & 
Banting, 2008).   
 
Two main reasons have been put forth to explain the lack of “on the ground” changes: federalism and funding 
(Boismenu, 2006; Graefe & Levesque, 2006). Simply put, Canadian federal and provincial governments have 
been caught in debates surrounding constitutional jurisdictions and accountability mechanisms. The fact that 
labour market programming for persons with disabilities has attracted little funding, especially when compared to 
the early learning and child care fields (Friendly & White, 2008), has further complicated matters. The result has 
been a stymieing of learning and innovation. Yet there have been few incentives to innovate, given the lack of 
competition for program and service provision. Hence, old programs have been repackaged to capture changing 
funding priorities, with provinces holding a virtual monopoly on the provision of services for persons with 
disabilities, including those for labour market programming (Prince, 2004). This provincial response is not 
unusual and is consistent with the division of powers under Canada’s constitution, which assigns provinces 
jurisdiction for social programs.  
 
This narrow interpretation of the situation ignores Canada’s rich history of federal funding of interest groups to 
provide services in areas of provincial jurisdiction in order to achieve Pan-Canadian social policy goals (Graham 
& Phillips, 1997; Lindquist, 2005). The direct funding of disability organizations by the federal government 
continues to this day, albeit on a more limited scale. For example, the federal government currently provides 
approximately $30 million per year through the Opportunities Fund to disability organizations for innovative 
programming for persons with disabilities who would otherwise not qualify for other programs (HRSDC, 2008). In 
doing so, the federal government is recognizing limitations in current programs and the broader situation. The 
provinces and the federal government seem to be locked in a “tussle” with each other, and programming for 
persons with disabilities is caught in the crosshairs (Prince, 2004; Bach, 2002; Hanes & Moscovitch, 2002). It is 
simplistic to think that more federal monies provided to the provinces alone would help matters. If that were the 
case, then Canada’s healthcare woes would have long been solved (Commission on the Future of Health Care 
in Canada, 2002). Instead, the real culprit may be the lack of competition the provinces currently face given its 
lock on the provision of these services (Powers, Sowers, & Singer, 2006; Weaver, 1994). To unleash innovation, 
the position advanced in this article is for the federal government to facilitate an innovative environment by 
recouping its proud tradition of directly funding civil society groups to meet social goals. However, in doing so, 
the ability of disability organizations to fulfil this innovative programmatic role is questioned. 
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The operational definition of “innovation” used in this research is relatively broad, and refers to a program or 
policy that is new to the state adopting it; can be shallow, intermediate, or deep; is often evolutionary and 
adaptive; and may occur at any level of governance (Walker, 1969; Desveaux, Lindquist, & Toner, 1994; 
Golden, 1990; Zegans, 1992). Combining employment programs for persons with disabilities from various 
government initiatives into one portfolio in order to claim federal funding, as was done by Prince Edward Island, 
does not qualify here as innovative, given that no new programs were developed and existing programs were 
repackaged and continued (Graefe & Levesque, 2010). Alternatively, the enhancement of labour market 
programming, such as an increase in the number or length of time that services are offered, would be 
considered innovative given such enhancements would be new to the state adopting it (even though such 
changes may not be the most provocative).  
 
This article assesses the capacity of disability organizations to be vehicles for delivering innovative labour 
market programs for persons with disabilities. The term “disability organizations” is defined here as non-
governmental organizations that provide services such as employment preparation and training and related 
services for persons with disabilities (see Tables 1a and 1b). In essence, it is a subset of the broad category of 
“interest organizations,” which Hendriks (2006) defines to include "elite and active policy actors such as 
stakeholders, pressure groups, lobby groups, representative organizations, secondary associations, activists, 
scientists, government agencies, and corporations" yet excludes political parties (p. 572). The article proceeds in 
three parts. Methodologies used in the investigation are first profiled, followed by a contextual overview of 
disability organizations and policy in Canada. Capacity issues surrounding disability organizations are then 
assessed and discussed. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
This article is a Canadian case study that compares two traditionally have provinces (Ontario and Alberta), with 
three traditionally have not provinces (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick) to 
examine similarities and differences in capacity that may exist among select disability organizations. Such a 
comparison recognizes the fact that disability organizations operate in (and depend on) provinces with different 
financial capacities, which may provide organizations with different limitations and opportunities. A province is 
labelled as being have or have not depending on whether or not it receives federal equalization payments. 
These payments are made to provinces whose fiscal capacity is under the national average in order to bring 
them up to a standard whereby they may then deliver similar services at similar levels of taxation (Bakvis, Baier, 
& Brown, 2009). A province that receives equalization payments is considered to be a have not province, while a 
province that does not receive equalization payments is termed a have province. The descriptor “traditionally” is 
used in recognition of the fact that since 2009–2010 Ontario has received equalization payments from Ottawa 
thus becoming a have not province, while the exact opposite situation has occurred with Newfoundland and 
Labrador—it is now a have province (Finance Canada, n.d.). However, the provinces are grouped into their 
traditional categories to reflect the time period of study 2005–2010, to stay consistent with earlier work 
highlighting funding impediments (e.g., Graefe & Levesque, 2010), and the fact that the recent changes in 
financial status will not yet have had adequate time to trickle down to disability organizations and dramatically 
alter finances.  
 
Disability organizations selected for examination are all registered charities under the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) regulations to facilitate data accumulation. Charitable tax returns were used to obtain a snapshot of 
disability organizations. Yearly charitable returns are filed with the CRA and made available to the public via the 
Charities and Giving website, thus facilitating data collection (see http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-
eng.html). The information is, however, not “necessarily” verified thus bringing its reliability into question (Canada 
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Revenue Agency, 2011). Registered charities must limit their political advocacy work on a sliding scale between 
20% and 10% of their resources. Organizations with an annual revenue in excess of $200,000 are limited to a 
10% allocation of resources to political activities, while registered charities with an annual income of less than 
$50,000 may allocate up to 20% of this revenue toward political activities (Canada Revenue Agency, 2003). 
Hence, disability organizations profiled herein primarily focus on service provision. 
 
The disability organizations selected for review were first identified through website searches of the “links” pages 
of various disability organizations and government websites. Additional organizations were identified through 
Internet searches. This facilitated the development of preliminary lists for the selection of disability organizations, 
which were based on a convenience sample along three axes: employment services, assistive devices, and 
hearing services.  
 
Quantitative data gleaned from the charitable tax returns for the years 2005–2010 was gathered to assess 
issues of capacity. Capacity is defined in this research as the human, financial, and technological resources of a 
disability organization. Human resources refer to the average number of employees and the ratio of full-time and 
part-time employees. Financial resources include the ability of organizations to meet their short-term obligations 
(liquidity ratio), an assessment of their main funding sources and expenditures, as well as their ability to raise 
funds (fundraising ratio). Technological resources refer to the amount invested in equipment, computers, 
vehicles, and furniture. It does not include land and buildings. A forensic review of selected disability 
organizations is not the goal of this examination, but rather it is to provide a snapshot of the relative health or 
vibrancy of disability organizations in order to gauge whether such organizations in traditionally have or have not 
provinces face similar capacity issues, and whether such issues are consistent across three specific sub-
sectors—employment services, assistive devices, and hearing services. 
 
Having the capacity to deliver innovative programs is dependent on factors beyond an organization’s human, 
financial, and technological assets, such as social capital (Putnam, 2000). People and infrastructure are needed 
to deliver programs, as well as sufficient financial resources to develop and refine programs. Adequate financial 
resources are required if implementation difficulties arise and additional investment is required to overcome 
them. To be sure, adequate human, financial, and technological resources do not guarantee a quality or 
innovative program (especially if the program is poorly designed) but may increase its likelihood (Damanpour & 
Schneider, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2002; Bull & Bane, 2001; Mulroy & Shay, 1997). 
 
The quantitative profile was then compared with interview data provided by officials from a sample of the 
disability organizations studied in order to evaluate its congruence. A total of six semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with content analyses of interview transcriptions revealing major themes for comparison.  
 
CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW: DISABILITY ORGANIZATIONS AND POLICY IN CANADA  
 
Valuing disability organizations 
 
A broad look at disability organizations conceived as voluntary and community organizations involved in service 
delivery and/or advocacy work on behalf of a specific clientele (White, 2005) finds that they are important conduits 
for learning, which leads to a vibrant and engaged citizenry over the course of one’s life (Canadian Centre on 
Disability Studies, 2002; Eldson, Reynolds, & Steward, 1995; Putnam, 2000). These organizations represent wide 
constituencies and are, as such, means of inclusion, representation, and participation (Meadowcroft, 2004). 
Gouthro (2010) has shown how people turn to community organizations at transition points in their lives for 
services either they or a family member need. Combined with the fact that community care is often considered 
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ideal, given the importance of independence and citizenship as entitlement to rights and justice (Bron, 2003; 
Peter, Spalding, Kenny, Conrad, McKeever, & Macfarlan, 2007), one can see how community organizations 
contribute to the health of a community in many ways including employment, education, psychologically, and 
culturally (Gouthro, 2010).  
 
A narrower focus on disability organizations finds a similar result. It is through the engagement of disability 
organizations that governments acquire information, dispel myths, and enhance the credibility of their policy or 
services. At the same time, the disability community benefits in the form of expanded inclusion, increased civic 
capacity, and sense of citizenship (Prince, 2010; Hendriks, 2006; Mansbridge, 1992). As a Canadian Centre on 
Disability Studies (CCDS) (2002) study found, a common public understanding of disability issues is crucial to 
the advancement of a disability policy agenda. This underscores the emancipatory role social enterprises may 
have on persons with disabilities. That is, in addition to their social purpose, organizations generate economic 
value relating to the production of goods and services, employment of persons with disabilities, and asset 
ownership (Quarter & Mook, 2010; Quarter, Mook, & Armstrong, 2009; Mook, Quarter, & Ryan, 2010). 
 
Policy context 
 
Disability organizations can be seen as an integral part of society, yet over the past 40 years their relationships 
with governments have ebbed and flowed (Roberts, 2001). As the welfare state enlarged in the 20th century, 
voluntary organizations increasingly became involved in both advocacy and service delivery (Graham & Phillips, 
1997). This is seen in the disability policy field where disability organizations deliver key vocational training 
activities. Governments at the time were the main funders of these programs, which included funds to meet 
operational costs. By the 1980s, some organizations came under scrutiny for financial irregularities, and a 
decade later, while facing unprecedented high debt levels, the federal government unilaterally made deep cuts 
to transfers to the provinces for health and social programs and discontinued operational grants to disability 
organizations (White, 2008). The new norm became one of contracting with governments and strict new 
accountability measures (Larner, 2000). Disability organizations, like others, were now competing against each 
other for contracts through tendering processes, which worked against their previous collaborative behaviour 
(Eakin, 2002; Cloutier-Fisher & Skinner, 2004). This new climate, in particular, the loss of core operational 
funding, was devastating for organizations and many ceased to exist (White, 2008; Cardozo, 1996).  
 
This crisis in the voluntary sector led to developments on two fronts. On the first front, organizations came 
together to address accountability and funding issues, yet these efforts were co-opted by the Liberal 
government’s 1999–2004 Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI), (Panel on Accountability and Governance in the 
Voluntary Sector, 1999). This initiative minimized or dismissed funding issues (White, 2005) and tried to 
legitimize the federal government’s policy direction by committing it to consider the impact of its actions on 
voluntary community organizations (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2002). This recognition was a hollow victory at 
best, given the lack of funding discussions and that the process was captured by elite organizations—on the 
ground organizations that provided services were not involved in the process (Brock, 2003; Phillips, 2001; Panel 
on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, 1999).  
 
On the second front, the severe federal budgetary cutbacks in the 1990s, the failed attempts at constitutional 
change (Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords), and the subsequent 1995 Québec referendum on 
sovereignty, pressured the federal government to demonstrate the positive workings of the federation through 
non-constitutional means (Young, 1999; Lazar, 1998). Broad framework agreements were developed, aimed at 
disentangling responsibilities and elaborating new rules to direct intergovernmental relations. The 1999 Social 
Union Framework Agreement (SUFA) was one such agreement. SUFA was a significant document in that the 
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federal government conceded that they would consult the provinces before spending in their areas of 
constitutional jurisdiction. In return, the provinces acknowledged that the federal government could spend in 
areas of provincial jurisdiction (Government of Canada, 1999). This pattern of cross-fertilization of jurisdictions 
has since waned under successive Harper Conservative governments with its emphasis on the provision of “no 
strings attached” funding to the provinces as they embrace a more classical model of Canadian federalism (e.g., 
healthcare; Stephen Harper Interview by Peter Mansbridge, January 16, 2012). However, it is from this 
framework agreement, the SUFA, which several social policy agreements followed such as Labour Market 
Programming for Persons with Disabilities. 
 
Labour market programs for persons with disabilities 
 
For persons with disabilities, changes to labour market programs were a long time coming. Vocational 
rehabilitation and training was the focus under the Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons Act (VRDP) 
from 1961–1997. While expansive in orientation in that it included support for sheltered workshops, employment 
research aid, and respite services, the focus was on a custodial care model and not one of independent living or 
full inclusion into society. Under the VRDP, the federal and provincial governments entered into two- to three-
year cost-sharing agreements to deliver various programs. Cost sharing was 50:50, until 1994 when the federal 
government capped its contribution as part of the 1994 Program Review (Kroeger, 1996; Phillips, 1995).  
 
A series of reports in the 1980s and 1990s challenged the custodial care model, and culminated in the 1998 In 
Unison report (Burns & Gordon, 2011; Graefe & Levesque, 2010). This document elaborated a clear vision for 
persons with disabilities in advancing their full participation in society. To meet this end, changes were required 
in disability supports, employment preparation, and income supports (Government of Canada, 1998). 
Foreshadowing this change in philosophy and to meet the employment preparation pole, the Multilateral 
Framework for Employability Assistance for People with Disabilities (EAPD) was negotiated between the federal 
and provincial governments in 1997, along with five-year bilateral agreements (1998) (Government of Canada, 
1997; Human Resources Development Canada , 2002). The federal contribution of 50% was capped at $190 
million per year and elaborate accountability provisions surrounding the preparation and sharing of annual plans 
and reports were introduced. The range of services funded under the EAPDs was reduced and funding for 
sheltered workshops and addictions services was terminated. By all accounts, the EAPDs were of limited 
success. Programs largely remained the same, and addictions services and sheltered workshops continued to 
be funded (Graefe & Levesque, 2010, forthcoming). The new accountability provisions were a point of constant 
friction between federal and provincial officials, given that annual plans had to be reviewed and approved by 
federal officials, while reporting requirements proved to be onerous (Graefe & Levesque, 2006, 2010). Further 
changes were required. 
 
The successor agreement, the Multilateral Framework for Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities 
(2003), and its bilateral agreements (2004) have proven to be no better (Graefe & Levesque, 2010, forthcoming). 
These two-year agreements, continually renewed and set to expire in 2012, continued the focus on employability. 
That is, the focus remained on the design and delivery of a suite of employment programming, including education 
and training for persons with disabilities (Government of Canada, 2003). The provinces received increased 
flexibility in reporting requirements and a slim increase in yearly funding from the federal government (up to $230-
million per year). An extensive review of three have not provinces (i.e., financially challenged; Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island) and two have provinces (i.e., financially able; Ontario, and Alberta) found 
that little program innovation and learning had occurred. When it did occur, as in limited cases with the have 
provinces, it was due to decisions taken and increases in funding by provincial governments. For the have not 
provinces, ineligible programs such as sheltered workshops and addictions services continued to be funded and 
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no new programs were developed. In essence, new monies were used to fund existing programs to ensure their 
continuation. More broadly, funding has proved to be insufficient, with officials from disability organizations 
stating that much more could be done if only jurisdictional battles were set aside and funding increased (Graefe 
& Levesque, 2010).  
 
Overcoming the jurisdictional impasse  
 
While enhanced funding may well help improve matters, little may be achieved if additional monies are directed 
to a monopoly provider. Such is the current situation in Canada, with the provinces given preeminence in the 
social policy realm. Few incentives exist for the provinces to innovate given the lack of competition they face for 
the provision of services for persons with disabilities. Coupled with the lack of a unified voice from the disability 
community (Elson, 2011), the provinces have had wide latitude for disability related programming. Enhanced or 
redirecting existing (some) federal funding, as is currently done with the Opportunities Fund, directly to disability 
organizations can challenge existing provincial monopolies on labour market programming for persons with 
disabilities by fostering an innovative environment.  
 
The direct federal funding of interest groups is not without precedent. The Opportunities Fund (OF) could serve as 
a template for use by the federal government. Since its inception in 1997, the Opportunities Fund has helped 
persons with disabilities to “prepare for, obtain, and maintain employment or self-employment” (Human Resources 
and Social Development Canada, n.d.). Individuals, employers, or organizations apply directly to the federal 
government for funds to support employment activities such as to increase their job skills or to integrate into the 
workforce. Funding is targeted for persons with disabilities who are not eligible for Employment Insurance benefits. 
The OF is small and has been capped at approximately $30-million annually though it has received an additional 
$30-million over three years announced as part of Budget 2012 (Government of Canada, 2012). While appreciative 
of the funding, disability organizations have observed that the fund is limiting in that only national projects (i.e., 
delivered in at least three provinces) qualify for funding and that the funding is for short-term projects only (i.e., 
maximum three years) and meet strict accountability requirements (Graefe & Levesque, 2010; Human Resources 
and Social Development Canada, n.d.; Rioux & Prince, 2002). Provinces to date have not been concerned about 
this program given the relatively small dollar amounts involved (Graefe & Levesque, 2010). Hence, a mechanism 
exists to foster a more productive environment to spur innovation and learning yet it calls into question the capacity 
of disability associations to deliver such innovative programming.  
 
PROFILE OF DISABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Charitable returns for 15 disability organizations were reviewed for the years 2005–2010. This consisted of three 
disability organizations in each of the five provinces selected for the study (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Alberta). For each province, care was taken to select a representative 
organization along three axes: employment services, assistive devices, and hearing services. Tables 1a and 1b 
list the charities studied and provide a brief profile of their main program areas and clients as identified in their 
charitable returns. 
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Table 1a. Disability organizations selected for study, program areas, 
have not provinces 
 
 
Province 
Employment 
services 
Assistive 
devices 
Hearing  
services 
    
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
Coalition of Persons with Disabilities  Learning Disabilities 
Association of NL 
Canadian Hard of 
Hearing Association – 
NL Inc. 
Program areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
Nova Scotia 
• 40%   Advocacy 
• 30%   Human rights 
• 15%   Public education 
            (multi-disability) 
 
 
Affirmative Industry Association of 
Nova Scotia 
• 100% Literacy  
   programs 
 
 
 
 
Easter Seals Nova Scotia  
 
• 75%   Other 
• 10%   Seniors' services 
• 10%   Support &  
   services for charitable  
   sector 
 
Society of Deaf and Hard 
of Hearing Nova Scotians  
 
Program areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Brunswick 
 
• 100%   Employment  
   preparation and  training (primarily 
mental health clients) 
 
 
 
 
Community Industries Employment 
Vocational Association Inc. 
 
• 50%   Services for  
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
• 20%   Promotion &  
   protection of health 
• 20%   Employment  
   preparation & training 
 
Canadian Rehabilitation 
Council for the Disabled 
 
 
• 60%   Interpreter &  
   note taking services 
• 30%   Services for  
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
• 10%   Literacy  
   programs 
 
South-east Deaf & Hard 
of Hearing Association 
 
Program areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 90%   Services for  
   physically or& mentally  
   challenged 
• 10%   Vocational/  
   technical training 
 
• 56%   Services for    
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
• 28%   Summer camps 
• 16%   Support and  
   services for charitable     
   sector 
 
 
• 80%   Services for  
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
• 5%   Cultural    
   programs, including  
   heritage languages 
• 5%   Literacy programs 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency. Charities listings. URL: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html 
[February 5, 2011].    
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Table 1b. Disability organizations selected for study, program areas, have provinces 
 
 
Province 
Employment 
services 
Assistive 
devices 
Hearing  
services 
 
Ontario 
 
LEADS Employment Services 
London Inc 
 
Ontario Society For Crippled 
Children 
 
Deaf Access Simcoe 
Muskoka 
 
Program areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alberta 
 
 
Program areas: 
 
 
• 50%   Services for  
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
• 50%   Employment  
   preparation and    
   training 
 
 
Employabilities Society of 
Alberta 
 
• 100%   Employment  
   preparation and   
   training (multi-disability) 
 
• 70%   Services for    
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
• 10%   Summer camps 
• 10%   Public  
   education, other study    
   programs 
 
Alberta Easter Seals Society 
 
• 88%   Services for physically or 
mentally challenged 
• 12%   Housing for  
   seniors, low-income, and those     
with disabilities 
 
• 100%   Services for    
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
 
 
 
 
 
Alberta Deaf Sports 
Association 
 
• 100%   Services for    
   physically or mentally  
   challenged 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency. Charities listings. URL: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html 
[February 5, 2011].    
 
Disability Organizations and Capacity Issues 
 
Context 
 
A significant percentage of the Canadian population has a disability. As shown in Table 2, almost 17% or 4.2 
million Canadians have a disability. The rate is lowest in Alberta (15.8%) and higher in Nova Scotia (23%) and 
New Brunswick (19.8%). The higher rates in the two Maritime provinces may be a reflection of the industrial 
base, with forestry and fishing activities being high risk occupations.  
 
Persons with disabilities tend to be financially worse off than persons without disabilities. In a review of 
employment rates from 1993–2006, Crawford (2012) found persons with disabilities twice as likely to be 
unemployed when compared to those without disabilities, which, as he notes, has been long recognized by 
governments, disability organizations, and researchers alike (pp. 3–4). Similarly, the median total income for 
adults (15 years +) with a disability is 69–73% that of those without disabilities, as shown in Table 2. The gap is 
noteworthy especially when one considers actual dollar figures. For example, in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
the total median income for an adult with disabilities in 2006 was $14,761, which rose to $22,378 in Alberta. 
Such financial disparities challenge one’s ability to meet their needs given the additional costs they often face in 
dealing with their disability. For instance, two thirds of persons with disabilities use at least one assistive device 
(e.g., respiratory aids, computers, wheelchairs), 39% of whom report their needs are either not met or only 
partially met, largely due to financial considerations (Statistics Canada, 2010).  
 
Family members are heavily relied upon for financial help in 70% of cases and for the 2.4 million adult persons 
with disabilities that require help in meeting their everyday needs (e.g., meal preparation, household chores, 
Levesque (2012) 
 
appointments), family members remain the primary caregivers in 83% of the cases (Statistics Canada, 2010). 
Such challenges limit the full inclusion of persons with disabilities into the work force, while increasingly 
challenging the time and resources of family members.  
 
Table 2. Adults, median income of persons with disabilities (2006) 
 
 Total 
population 
(No.) 
Population persons 
with disabilities 
(No., %) 
 Median total 
income adults 
15yrs+ without 
disability ($) 
Median total income 
adults 15yrs+ with 
disability ($, %) 
Canada 25,422,280 4,215,520 (16.6)  27,496 19,199 (70) 
      
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
421,190 71,500 (17)  21,213 14,761 (70) 
Nova Scotia 750,240 172,570 (23)  24,959 18,231 (73) 
New Brunswick 595,480 117,860 (19.8)  24,337 16,796 (69) 
      
Ontario 9,777,220 1,770,760 (18.1)  29,326 20,955 (71) 
Alberta 2,596,410 410,600 (15.8)  30,525 22,378 (73) 
Source: Statistics Canada. (2007). Participation and activity limitation survey 2006. URL:  http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-
bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=3251&lang=en&db=imdb&adm= 8&dis=2 [February 5, 2011]. 
 
Human resources 
 
Overall, two points emerge along the human dimension of disability organizations selected for the study as 
shown in Table 3. First, there are a higher number of full-time workers in the disability organizations in the have 
provinces, suggesting that these organizations are simply larger in size. However, when population differences 
are taken into consideration, one observes a higher rate of full-time employment per capita in the have not 
provinces. This suggests more people are required to deliver needed services, perhaps due to a sparse 
population spread out over a larger geographical area than in the have not provinces. A similar situation exists in 
relation to part-time workers, though not to the same degree. The exception to this pattern is New Brunswick 
where we find the greatest number of part-time workers in disability organizations. As we will see in the next 
section, this is part of a larger funding challenge facing disability organizations in New Brunswick who have 
increasingly turned to part-time workers to carry much of the workload. 
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Table 3. Human resources, 5-year average (2005–2010) 
 
 Full-Time   Part-Time   
 
Province 
Number 
of 
staff 
Average  
wages ($) 
Per capita 
wages ($) 
 
Number 
of  
staff 
Average  
wages ($) 
Per capita 
wages ($) 
Have-not provinces       
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
 
 
4 
 
32,041 
 
0.25 
  
3 
 
2,922 
 
0.02 
Nova Scotia 9 45,368 0.44  13 4,553 0.06 
 
 
11 
 
 
26,251 
 
 
0.39 
 
 
30 
 
 
3,651 
 
 
0.15 
 
New Brunswick 
Average 
 8 34,385 0.13 
 
15 3,944 0.03 
Have provinces       
Ontario 
 
29 54,841 0.004  23 19,135 0.001 
20 46,284 0.01 23 8,197 0.002 Alberta 
Average 25 50,322 0.003 
 
23 13,666 0.001 
Note: Information derived from Section C and/or Schedule 3 of the Registered Charity Information Return. Averages and 
per capita calculations computed by author using population data from: Statistics Canada. (2011). Population by year, by 
province and territory. CANSIM, Table 051-0001. URL: http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm [February 
5, 2011]. 
 
The second point to be observed is that full-time employees are on average better paid in the have provinces 
($50,322 compared to $34,385). The five-year average yearly full-time wages are highest in Ontario ($54,841) 
and lowest in New Brunswick ($26,251). When broken down on a per capita basis and similar to employment 
numbers above, we find on average a higher level of remuneration in the have not provinces ($0.13) when 
compared to the have provinces ($0.003). This is a wage difference of up to 43 times larger in the have not 
provinces (with Nova Scotia an outlier). Part-time workers in the have provinces are also on average better paid 
than their counterparts in the have not provinces as shown in Table 3. 
 
However, such comparisons may mask important cost-of-living differences across provinces. To address this, 
wages for employees in disability organizations are compared to the average wage for each province—we find 
that the full-time five-year average compensation for employees in disability organizations for all provinces is 
higher than their respective provincial average earnings of workers except for those workers in New Brunswick 
whose five-year average for full-time workers is approximately $2,000 less than the 2006 Census Canada 
provincial average (compare figures in Table 3 and Table 4). Moreover, the variation in the magnitude of the 
difference in wages for full-time workers is similar across provinces, suggesting similar cost-of-living effects, thus 
providing some confidence in the interprovincial comparisons as shown in Table 4 (with New Brunswick as the 
outlier). The above trends hold at the sectoral level.1  
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Table 4. Average earnings of the population 15 years & over (2006) 
 
Province Average earnings 
($) 
Average earnings as % of 
average provincial 
disability organization 
 
Have not provinces 
 
	  
	  
	  
Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
 
27,636 86.3 
Nova Scotia 30,187 66.5 
 
28,450 
28,758	  
108.4 
 
 
New Brunswick 
Average 
  
Have provinces  
Ontario 
 
38,099 69.5 
42,233 91.2 Alberta 
Average 
 
Canada 
40,166 
 
35,498 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. (2007). 2006 Census. URL: http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/ 
cst01/labor50a-eng.htm [April 15, 2011]. 
 
Financial resources 
 
Measures of the financial capacity of disability organizations are their liquidity, revenue dependency, and main 
expenditures. Liquidity is a measure of an organization’s ability to turn assets into cash quickly to meet short-
term obligations. This is captured by the Quick Ratio (QR) and is calculated by dividing an organization’s current 
assets (cash + receivables) by their current liabilities (debt + payables) (Bragg, 2006). A ratio of less than “1” 
(e.g., 0.75) means that an organization would be unable to meet its short-term obligations if they came due all at 
once (e.g., it would only be able to meet 75% of its short-term obligations) and is an indication that the 
organization is not in good financial health.  
 
Quick Ratios calculated for the disability organizations studied in the five provinces show that all but one 
(discussed further below) are in good financial health in a liquidity sense. In the have not provinces, QRs range 
from 2.11 in Nova Scotia and 3.87 in New Brunswick to a high of 22.43 in Newfoundland and Labrador.2 
Similarly, in the have provinces, QRs range from 4.45 in Ontario to 9.39 in Alberta. Overall, the have provinces 
are on average in a slightly better financial position than have not provinces (average QRs of 5.79 and 4.42 
respectively) and both meet industry standards (Jackson & Fogarty, 2005). 
 
Selected revenue streams for the disability organizations studied are profiled in Table 5. The results reveal some 
major differences between the have and have not provinces. On average and on a per capita basis, have not 
provinces are twice as dependent on revenues from provincial governments ($0.09 vs. $0.05 per person) with 
funding from other levels of government limited. Combined with the fact disability organizations in the have not 
provinces are seven times more dependent on revenues from the sale of goods and services ($0.07 vs. $0.01 
per person) and are three times more dependent on revenue from fundraising ($0.11 vs. $0.04 per person), 
these organizations face a challenging endeavour in servicing their customers. The very people these 
organizations are expected to serve are expected to shoulder a significantly larger fraction of the costs of the 
services—all in geographical areas that are traditionally financially challenged. This may explain the heavier 
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reliance on the provincial government for revenues and underscores the importance of equalization payments to 
the have not provinces.  
 
Table 5. Revenue stream profile ($) for disability organizations reviewed, 
5-year average (2005–2010) 
 
 
 
Province 
 
Charitable 
receipts  
 
Federal 
government  
 
Provincial 
government  
 
Municipal 
government  
From 
other 
charities  
Sale of 
goods/ 
Services  
 
Fund-
raising  
 
Have not provinces 
 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
 
 
14,220 
 
35,908 
 
24,931 
 
--- 
 
963 
 
472 
 
633,415 
Nova Scotia 
 
111,537 10,051 246,075 16,555 40,930 176,567 105,337 
44,417 48,285 312,296 481 16,346 261,327 10,095 New Brunswick 
Average 
(per capita) 
56,725 
(0.09) 
31,415 
(0.01) 
194,254 
(0.09) 
5,679 
(0.00) 
19,413 
(0.01) 
146,122 
(0.07) 
249,616 
(0.11) 
 
Have provinces 
 
Ontario 
 
2,280,456 
 
246,635 
 
668,385 
 
75,045 
 
100,504 
 
48,038 
 
1,084,897 
 
496,157 
 
92,883 
 
991,548 
 
2,710 
 
100,765 
 
140,098 
 
188,921 
 
Alberta 
Average 
(per capita) 
1,388,307 
(0.08) 
169,759 
(0.01) 
829,967 
(0.05) 
38,877 
(0.00) 
100,635 
(0.01) 
94,068 
(0.01) 
636,909 
(0.04) 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency. Charities listings. URL: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html 
[February 5, 2011]. Calculations (averages, per capita) made by author. 
 
Expenditures are profiled in Table 6. They show that on average on a per capita basis, expenditures are 
significantly greater in the have not provinces. This may be related to the greater need for disability services 
given the higher rate of persons with disabilities in those provinces. It also places a larger financial stress on 
disability organizations to deliver the needed services, something for which those utilizing the services are 
expected to pay a larger share, as noted above.  
 
Lastly, the fundraising ratio was calculated based on the dollars raised versus the costs spent on fundraising 
efforts. On average and on the whole, as Table 6 shows, have not provinces are much better at fundraising than 
have provinces, raising $1.43 versus $1.09 in revenues for every dollar spent of fundraising. However, note the 
wide variations, which may be due to a number of factors. For instance, organizational size matters, with smaller 
organizations tending to report increases in charitable receipts less often (Nonprofit Research Collaborative, 
2012), perhaps due to the fact that on average they expect to face higher overhead cost ratios when compared 
to large organizations (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2008). Much also depends on an organization’s 
infrastructure, such as donor databases and dedicated fundraising staff (Ketchum Canada Inc., 2009). 
Fundraising ratios will also be affected by the type of fundraising event and time of year that the event is held 
(Canada Revenue Agency, 2009). It is because of these factors that many recommend the need to use three- to 
five-year rolling fundraising ratio averages, as well as other financial details, to obtain a fuller picture, as this 
article demonstrates.  
 
These results are consistent with surveys on giving, volunteering, and participating (Statistics Canada, 2004a). 
Disability organizations are part of the broader social service organization category. Organizations within this 
category typically attract high donor rates, but experience low donation values (Heinz, 2001; Statistics Canada, 
Levesque (2012) 
 
2006, 2009). Even so, fundraising efforts are considered poor, given that fundraising costs account for 70% or 
more of funds raised (see Canada Revenue Agency, 2009; Greenfield, 1999), something for which much work 
has been devoted to correcting through standards development among other things (Imagine Canada, 2011). 
Moreover, these results may be due to insufficient core infrastructure such as full-time employees, as shown 
above, and technological dimensions examined below (for a fuller discussion, see National Center for Charitable 
Statistics, 2005). 
 
The above financial dimension trends for quick ratios, revenue streams, and expenditures are, on the whole, 
generally consistent at the sectoral level (see Note 1). 
 
Table 6. Expenditure profile for disability organizations reviewed, 
5-year average (2005–2010). Totals ($), (per capita) 
 
 
 
Province 
 
Total 
per capita 
 
Total on 
programs 
Total on 
management 
and 
administration  
 
Total on 
fundraising 
 
Fundraising 
ratio 
 
Have not Provinces 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
715,912 
(1.41) 
 
130,747 
 
166,269 
 
406,668 
 
1.56 
 
Nova Scotia 
 
1,095,375 
(1.17) 
 
869,503 
 
90,606 
 
88,005 
 
1.20 
 
720,432 
(0.96) 
 
574,607 
 
110,033 
 
29,279 
 
0.34 
 
New Brunswick 
 
Average 
(per capita) 
843,906 
(0.38) 
524,952 
(0.24) 
122,303 
(0.06) 
174,651 
(0.08) 
1.43 
 
Have Provinces 
Ontario 4,986,954 
(0.39) 
3,777,234 300,702 860,576 1.26 
 
2,310,814 
(0.64) 
 
1,573,643 
 
443,856 
 
309,245 
 
0.61 
 
Alberta 
 
Average 
(per capita) 
3,648,884 
(0.22) 
2,675,439 
(0.16) 
372,279 
(0.02) 
584,911 
(0.04) 
1.09 
 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency. Charities listings. URL: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html 
[February 5, 2011]. Calculations (averages, per capita) made by author. 
 
Technological resources 
 
Technological resources are capital assets that include equipment, vehicles, computers, furniture, and fixtures. 
They do not include land and buildings. Taking stock of these items provides an indication of the tools in an 
organization’s possession available to carry out their work. As Table 7 shows, have not provinces are on 
average and across all sectors more heavily invested in technological aspects ($61,985 compared to $48,664) 
though some variation occurs across the sectors. Whether this is a good indication is debatable. For instance, 
the results suggest have not provinces have the tools to “do the job”; yet, this is deceiving given the sectoral 
differences. Moreover, have provinces may be renting equipment and furniture, which would not show up under 
this category since they would not own the material. One must also consider the fact that rental options may not 
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be available in the more sparsely populated have not provinces, thereby necessitating the purchase of 
equipment and further challenging the financial capacities of disability organizations in these provinces. When 
monies are tied up in capital assets, fewer resources are available for programs. 
 
Table 7. Investment in technology (e.g., equipment, computers, vehicles, furniture), 
5-year average (2005–2010). Sectoral Data ($), (per capita) 
 
 
Province 
Employment 
services 
Assistive 
devices 
Hearing 
services 
Overall 
summary 
 
Have not provinces 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
--- 6,586 144,039 50,208 
Nova Scotia 
 
11,752 
 
57,097 
 
43,679 
 
37,509 
 
292,513 
 
2,202 
 
--- 
 
98,238 
 
New Brunswick 
Average 
(per capita) 
101,422 
(0.05) 
21,962 
(0.01) 
62,573 
(0.03) 
61,985 
(0.03) 
 
Have provinces 
	   	   	  
Ontario 
 
56,732 --- 3,850 20,194 
174,702 55,569 1,135 77,135 Alberta 
Average 
(per capita) 
115,717 
(0.01) 
27,785 
(0.00) 
2,492 
(0.00) 
48,664 
(0.00) 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency. Charities listings. URL: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html 
[February 5, 2011]. Calculations (averages, totals, ratios) made by author. 
 
CONGRUENCE WITH INTERVIEW DATA 
 
The results above paint a mixed picture. Disability organizations are limited in their capacity to offer innovative 
programming without funds to cover core operating expenses such as staffing. While, in the aggregate, they are 
able to meet their short-term financial needs, expenditures are significant especially for those in the have not 
provinces, who depend greatly on revenues from the sale of their goods and services and from fundraising 
efforts. This places an extra burden on the very people who need and use the services and on the need to 
continually seek out funds. This suggests that disability organizations are “holding their own” but that they lack 
the ability to undertake long-term strategic planning, thereby hampering the potential development and delivery 
of innovative programming. These results are consistent with a 2003 Canadian Council on Social Development 
report that documented the tenuous position confronting nonprofits and voluntary organizations (Canadian 
Council on Social Development, 2003), as well as the 2004 National Survey on Nonprofits and Voluntary 
Organizations (Statistics Canada, 2004b), which came to similar conclusions, and suggests little has changed. 
 
These results were reinforced through interviews conducted with officials from these organizations after the 
quantitative analysis was completed. Indeed, human resources proved to be a significant challenge due to the 
lack of steady funding for core operating costs. Note that funding was largely based on a per project basis and 
while an allowance was built in for overhead costs, all officials interviewed stated that the actual dollars received 
were meagre and did not truly cover costs. More problematic is the fact that disability organizations do not 
receive payment unless a successful outcome is achieved such as continuous employment for a prolonged 
period of time (Agency officials 4 & 5). This places an added burden on disability organizations to “find” funds to 
cover costs incurred in such situations and underscores the importance of recipient selection. Given such risks, 
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disability organizations have increasingly turned to the practice of “creaming”—serving only those people who 
will likely succeed, as narrowly defined by governments, and not necessarily those people most in need of the 
service (Agency officials 4 & 6).  
 
Funding challenges also accentuate staffing issues. As one agency official stated, it really made it hard to attract 
staff given the short-term nature of positions (e.g., seven months) and the lack of benefits, and noted the high 
turnover in staff in nonprofits (Agency official 1). This same official lamented that even hirings for specific 
projects were challenging, given that many funding bodies disqualified those who had previously worked or 
volunteered for the organization. Not all disability organizations appear to experience such staffing challenges. 
For instance, some organizations in the have provinces noted they were fortunate in having low staff turnover. 
They attributed this to having “incredibly skilled” and flexible employees who could perform all positions in their 
organizations, thus facilitating their movement within organizations depending on changes in funding, as well as 
to making the organization a desirable and fun place to work (Agency officials 4 & 5).  
 
Capacity was also found to be lacking along technological dimensions. While project funds did offer some core 
operating funds for some basic needs on occasion, such as for photocopies and a laptop computer on one 
occasion, existing core operating funding did not cover technological needs (Agency official 1). Moreover, 
recognition and funding was required for the higher costs associated with meetings such as for sign language 
interpreters, large fonts, and Braille services. Such costs can quickly add up to $750–$800 per meeting before 
other costs such as for meeting space and technology (e.g., screens, projectors) (Agency official 2). It was also 
reported that technology deficits place a significant burden on disability organizations to seek out partnerships 
with businesses or other organizations to share equipment and space. 
 
The result is that organizations increasingly turn to fundraising efforts and rely on revenues from the sale of 
goods and services to meet core operating expenses. Yet, all interviewees recognized the precarious position 
this places their organizations in, that is, if the organization’s focus is on one major fundraising campaign or one 
or two services. If fewer funds are raised than expected, workers need to be let go or need to become part-time, 
which greatly increases the risk organizations face of losing them. Federal funding for specific projects also does 
not appear to be appealing. While funding opportunities are fewer and available funds smaller in nature, 
especially under the current Conservative government, funding is often short-term (e.g., six months to one year), 
cumbersome, difficult to access, and too specific in nature (e.g., targeted) (Agency officials 3 & 6). A number of 
organizations are also unsure what sources of federal funding exist and have given up seeking federal funds 
given the plethora of changes undertaken at Service Canada in the past few years (Agency officials 3, 4, 5, & 6).  
 
The short-term nature of funding was particularly troublesome and as one official noted was a “waste of time and 
energy” given that you could barely get a program up and running and a few months or a year later you could 
not do it anymore as the funding for it terminated (Agency official 3). Put differently, “you can’t train people [our 
clients] in less than one year to work” (Agency official 2). Agency officials were also pressured to “mainstream” 
programs; failing to do so meant they lost “innovation” funds, yet they felt that funding bodies lacked an 
understanding of the fact that programs were innovative for a reason—they did not fit the mainstream (Agency 
officials 4 & 5). Combined, these challenges have had the effect of making long-term strategic planning (e.g., 
five-year) very difficult and has left disability organizations in a constant state of “spinning their wheels” (Agency 
officials 1 & 2). 
 
 
 
 
Levesque (2012) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article examined one avenue for breaking the logjam between accountability and learning in order to 
unleash a round of programmatic innovation in relation to labour market programming for persons with 
disabilities: it examined the capacity of disability organizations in order to gauge their ability to provide innovative 
programs. Disability organizations have intimate knowledge of the needs of persons with disabilities yet seek 
stable long-term funding to meet their goals.  
 
The conclusion that emerges from this investigation is that while disability organizations are relatively well 
positioned to deliver innovative programming, they are undermined by the lack of stable core operating funds, 
which have long been called for (e.g., Roberts, 2001). Broadly speaking, the figures suggest that disability 
organizations in the five provinces possess significant human resources. Remuneration for full-time workers is 
significantly higher than the provincial average earnings (except for New Brunswick). The results are even 
initially more favourable for the have not provinces where on a per capita basis, they seem to be better staffed 
with higher per capita average wages. Yet when one considers their sparse population dispersed over large 
territories, any potential human resource advantage may be negated, hence the need for a significant number of 
part-time workers, as was revealed. This suggests that disability organizations have a limited capacity to provide 
innovative programming without additional funding for core operating expenses such as for employees, a 
limitation that is felt more in the have not provinces. 
 
Overall, the disability organizations studied are well able to meet their short-term financial obligations, with all 
organizations meeting the Quick Ratio standard. Of concern for disability organizations in the have not provinces 
is their significantly higher reliance on revenues from the people they serve through the sale of goods and 
services and on fundraising efforts as compared to the have provinces. However, the very people in these have 
not provinces that face the extra burden for paying for services, either through constant fundraising efforts or 
through service fees, is something many can ill afford, and something those in the have provinces do not face to 
the same degree. Given some of the financial challenges faced in the have not provinces, this places an added 
emphasis on government revenues. This underscores the importance of federal provincial transfers, which form 
a significant part of have not provinces revenues, up to 40% in Newfoundland and Labrador in some years and 
consistently between 28–35% in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (calculations made from Statistics Canada 
[2004–2008] Public Sector Statistics). Funding parameters are also underscored by the fact that the have not 
provinces face greater expenditure costs (on average and per capita). 
 
The net effect is the limits that the lack of core funding places on disability organizations’ capacity to offer 
innovative programming; a point officials from these organizations emphasized and which is most acute in the 
have not provinces. If federal and provincial governments addressed this deficiency, it would allow disability 
organizations to more fully contribute in governance activities. As revealed in this examination, the federal 
government remains insignificant in terms of direct funding of disability organizations, even with the 2012 
Economic Action Plan’s proposed changes to the Opportunities Fund, which would see an additional $30-million 
over three years available for disability programming (Government of Canada, 2012).3 While the increase in 
funding is welcomed, much more is needed to create an environment to spur innovation in order to significantly 
address the needs of persons with disabilities. This situation will likely remain unfulfilled given the current 
Conservative federal government’s ideological disposition and priorities.  
 
The above conclusions are a preliminary indication of the capacity that disability organizations in Canada 
possess, yet more work that examines a larger sample of disability organizations is required to ferret out 
capacity issues and funding mechanisms. In terms of funding mechanisms alone, research examining 
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fundraising campaigns by charities may help reveal best practices guidelines to guide future fundraising efforts 
to help ensure their success. Such examination needs to be extended to disentangling differences in 
technological investments so as to help inform future charitable spending decisions. Such knowledge is 
important in that it will facilitate a fuller participation of disability organizations in governance activities. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Detailed tables documenting sectoral data are not shown due to space limitations but are available from the 
author upon request. 
2. For disability organizations profiled in Newfoundland and Labrador, their quick ratio of 22.43 is far beyond the 
desired standard of 1 or slightly higher. Such a high quick ratio figure is an indication of organizations having 
unproductive cash assets, that is, significant amounts of cash sitting in bank accounts that could be put to better 
use for the nonprofit (Jackson and Fogarty, 2005; Bowman, 2010). Further investigation is required to determine 
why this is so. 
3. Included in the proposed changes to the Opportunities Fund was the plan to establish a panel to identify 
private sector successes and best practices for labour market participation for persons with disabilities.  
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